This article draws on the remarkable investigative work carried out by Nawaat under the title “How Did Saïed Turn Criminal Reconciliation into a Hostage to Populist Promises?” (“How Did Kaïs Saïed Turn Criminal Reconciliation into a Hostage to Populist Promises?”), published on June 24, 2026, and authored by journalist Samih Beji Okkez (محمد سميح الباجي عكّاز). It draws on the article’s main findings while placing them within a broader analysis of the political, economic, and legal issues related to the evolution of criminal reconciliation in Tunisia.
Two days after the publication of this investigation, on Friday, June 26, 2026, Kaïs Saïed appointed the members of a new National Commission for Criminal Reconciliation at the Carthage Palace. This is the third commission established since the mechanism was created in November 2022, a sign of the difficulties faced by a process that, despite repeated announcements by the government, continues to struggle to produce the expected results.
For more than four years, “criminal settlement” (sulh jazâï) has held a unique place in Kaïs Saïed’s rhetoric. Presented as the tool that would make it possible to recover the billions “stolen from the people” in order to finance the development of marginalized regions, it was intended to symbolize a break with the practices of the old system and demonstrate the effectiveness of the new government.
However, as the years go by, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to hide the reality: the billions that were promised never materialized, the structures that were put in place have been overhauled several times, and officials have been replaced one after another, while the initial goals seem to be slipping further and further out of reach.
The criminal settlement has thus become much more than a mere administrative failure. Today, it stands as a symbol of the limitations of a system of government based on simplistic promises and the extreme personalization of public decision-making.
A Promise at the Heart of the Political Agenda
Long before he became president, Kaïs Saïed claimed that several billion dinars could be recovered from businessmen who had profited from corruption under Ben Ali.
The idea was appealing because of its simplicity: rather than raising taxes or negotiating with international donors, all that would be needed was to recover “the people’s money” to finance development in disadvantaged regions.
After July 25, 2021, this promise became one of the pillars of the new regime’s legitimacy. The criminal settlement was no longer merely a legal mechanism; it became proof that the President alone could right the injustices of the past and resolve the country’s economic difficulties.
But this view was based on a deeply simplified understanding of corruption. Corruption was no longer analyzed as a systemic phenomenon requiring institutional, judicial, and economic reforms, but rather as the work of a limited number of officials whose fortunes simply needed to be recovered.
This moral and personalized interpretation of the problem quickly came up against reality.
Disappointing results
The numbers speak for themselves.
Presented as one of the main drivers of regional development funding, criminal reconciliation has not produced the expected results. While Kaïs Saïed had promised to recover 13.5 billion dinars, the amounts actually recovered, according to estimates available in mid-2023, amounted to only about 35 million dinars. This dramatic discrepancy has fueled questions about the feasibility of the program and the expectations it had raised.
This inability to produce concrete results explains the succession of legislative reforms, organizational changes, and, most recently, the appointment of a third chairperson of the National Commission on Criminal Procedure since its creation.
Each new failure is presented as the result of administrative roadblocks, internal resistance, or plots by alleged saboteurs—never as a call to question a concept that is itself flawed.
As a result, the project is constantly being revived without ever being properly evaluated.
A Justice System That Is Gradually Being Marginalized
The legal evolution of the system reveals a more profound transformation.
The decree-law of March 2022 established a National Commission on Criminal Settlements tasked with reviewing cases and reaching settlements.
However, in light of the poor results, the law was significantly amended in 2024.
Key decisions were gradually transferred to the National Security Council, chaired by the head of state himself.
This development marks a troubling shift.
A process that was initially governed by legal and administrative mechanisms is now increasingly being directed by the executive branch, to the detriment of judicial safeguards and the principle of separation of powers.
The logic of the rule of law is gradually giving way to a logic of permanent exception, in which institutions are reshaped according to the political needs of the moment.
The Quiet Winding Down of Transitional Justice
The criminal code also marks a break with the transitional justice process that began after the revolution.
The 2013 Organic Law entrusted the Truth and Dignity Commission with a comprehensive mandate: to establish the truth, recognize the victims, reform institutions, and combat impunity in a sustainable manner.
Criminal justice is based on a radically different philosophy. The truth becomes secondary. Institutional reform is abandoned. Political accountability is replaced by financial negotiations.
Corruption is no longer viewed as a structural phenomenon but rather as a mere property dispute that can be settled through a settlement agreement.
This approach undermines the very concept of transitional justice.
A tool for political oversight
As economic difficulties worsen, criminal proceedings are also increasingly being used as a means of exerting pressure.
When a businessperson knows that he or she may be sued or called upon to negotiate with the government, the balance of power between the political sphere and the private sector is profoundly altered.
Even in the absence of proven systematic abuses, this structure creates a clear risk of arbitrary action.
The government has an additional means of exerting influence over economic actors in a context where judicial checks and balances have been significantly weakened.
The resulting legal uncertainty contributes to a further deterioration of the business climate and discourages investment.
Lessons from International Experiences
The Tunisian experience stands in stark contrast to the mechanisms implemented in several countries that have actually succeeded in recovering illicit assets.
In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission made any measure of clemency contingent on full acknowledgment of the facts and the pursuit of the truth.
In the Philippines, the recovery of assets embezzled by the Marcos clan was carried out for several decades by a specialized, independent institution subject to judicial oversight.
In Nigeria, funds recovered from abroad have been subject to monitoring mechanisms involving the courts, international partners, and civil society to ensure their transparency.
In each of these cases, success was based neither on presidential announcements nor on the personalization of power.
It was the result of strong institutions, an independent judiciary, and transparent procedures.
The Impossible Admission of Failure
The paradox is now clear. The more the criminal justice system fails, the more the authorities are forced to keep it artificially alive.
Admitting that it was a failure would be tantamount to admitting that one of the main promises made on July 25, 2021, was unrealistic.
The project has thus become a prisoner of its own political function.
It is no longer primarily used to raise funds; rather, it serves to perpetuate a political narrative according to which all of the country’s difficulties stem from a handful of “corrupt individuals” who simply need to be forced to pay.
This narrative serves to deflect attention from the debate over the true causes of the Tunisian crisis: the collapse of investment, administrative paralysis, the lack of economic reforms, the erosion of the rule of law, and the growing concentration of power.
The Illusion of a Populist Promise
Criminal justice policy is no longer viewed today as a public policy that can be objectively evaluated.
He has come to symbolize a style of governance based on spectacular promises, the personalization of decisions, and the constant search for scapegoats outside the country to blame for its problems.
By substituting the president’s will for institutional mechanisms, gradually sidelining the judiciary, and turning a complex issue into a political slogan, those in power have themselves driven this project into a dead end.
Far from being a solution to corruption, criminal regulation now exemplifies another form of abuse: that of a state in which institutions cease to be safeguards and instead become instruments of a political legitimacy that can no longer acknowledge its own failures.
