1. Context: a climate of growing intimidation and repression

With viral reports of"extensive investigations" targeting dozens of associations, and the activation of a chain of asset freezes, the Tunisian authorities claim to be acting in the name of transparency and national sovereignty.
But in a state governed by the rule of law, the control of funding should not be confused either with generalized stigmatization, or with sanctioning without a judge.
We also need to point out - with supporting texts - what the law authorizes, what it regulates, and where abuses begin.

For the past two years, every episode of national tension - legislative elections with low turnout (2023), migratory crisis (2024), or environmental disaster in Gabès (2025) - has been accompanied by an offensive against civic space: spectacular raids, prosecutions of defenders, administrative suspension of the ATFD (October 24, 2025), pressure on the media, and public campaigns conflating foreign funding with undermining national security.

On the networks and in certain media, lists of names and "shock" amounts are published, attributed to NGOs and independent editorial offices. These figures, presented as extracts from reports by the Tunisian Financial Analysis Commission (CTAF/BCT) or the Court of Auditors, are rarely verifiable or made public in the terms put forward. This climate of generalized suspicion is gradually transforming the logic of prevention into de facto punishment.

Since mid-October 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office has confirmed the opening ofwide-ranging judicial investigations into several dozen associations accused of having received "suspicious" foreign funding, in particular from the American Open Society Foundations (OSF).
Information relayed through official and para-official channels is already pointing to asset freezes, suspension of activities, and even criminal prosecution for "undermining state security" or "money laundering".

These developments are part of a broader authoritarian tightening, marked by :

• suspension of the ATFD (October 24, 2025);
• the urgent convening of the appeal hearing in thecase of the plot against state security;
• the repression of social mobilizations in Gabès following the environmental disaster in October ;
• and the increasing criminalization of solidarity with migrants, refugees and human rights defenders.

These actions reflect a tightening of political and judicial control over the entire associative fabric, including against organizations historically recognized for their transparency, local roots and contribution to public debate - such as FTDES, I-Watch, Al-Bawsala, Solidar Tunisie, Inkyfada, Damj, Chouf or Mourakiboun.

2. an essential reminder: foreign financing of associations is legal

Decree-law n°2011-88 of September 24, 2011, which governs the Tunisian associative framework, explicitly authorizes associations to receive funding from abroad.

Article 35: "The association may receive donations, aid and subsidies from inside or outside the country, in accordance with the legislation in force, on condition that it informs the General Secretariat of the Government".

This text, adopted after the revolution, is based on a clear philosophy: freedom, transparency and responsibility.
It replaces the prior authorization system with a declaratory system, based on good faith and the publication of financial information.
The post-2011 legislator explicitly wanted to normalize international cooperation and encourage the development of civil society as a partner of the State.

To equate foreign funding with "interference" or "threat" directly contradicts the letter and spirit of Decree-Law 88, and constitutes an abusive interpretation of the law.

3. The criminalization of solidarity with migrants 

Since 2024, several associations working on migration and human rights have been the subject of criminal investigations or arbitrary prosecutions:

• Tunis Terre d'Asile (France Terre d'Asile Tunisia): its president Chérifa Riahi was arrested for "housing foreigners without authorization" (May 2024).
• Tunisian Refugee Council: its director Mustapha Jemali and his colleague Abderrazak Karimi have been detained since May 2024; their hearing is scheduled for November 24, 2025.
• Association Manamti: its founder Saïdia Msibah was arrested for "money laundering" and "illicit enrichment", on the basis of transfers from European donors.
• Association Tafdil al-Haqq fi al-Ikhtilaf (Right to Difference): its director Salwa Ghrissa is being prosecuted under anti-terrorism law for advocacy activities financed by European funds.

These organizations, which operate in the humanitarian and social fields, perform functions that the state itself no longer provides: reception, support, legal assistance, documentation.
To prosecute them for "undermining sovereignty" or "money laundering" is a clear violation of international law and a criminalization of solidarity.

4. Tunisia's legal obligations

a- Domestic law 

Decree-law no. 2011-88 provides for a strict scale of penalties:

1. Written warning and deadline for compliance ;
2. Temporary suspension (maximum 30 days), justified and notified ;
3. Dissolution by court order only.

The freezing of assets is governed by Organic Law no. 2015-26 on the fight against terrorism and money laundering.
This measure must be individual, justified, limited in time and subject to an effective appeal.
Its massive and preventive use, without publication of the reasons, diverts the law from its purpose.

b. International law

Tunisia is party to several binding instruments:

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 22): freedom of association, restrictions only lawful, necessary and proportionate.
• African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (art. 10): prohibition of arbitrary measures.
• UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (1998): positive obligation of the State to protect associations and individuals promoting human rights.

Current measures - automatic suspensions, unjustified asset freezes, prolonged detentions - are direct violations of these obligations.

5. Political and symbolic drift: "sovereignty" versus "civil society

Official rhetoric claims "protection of national sovereignty" against "malicious external financing".
But this rhetoric masks an attempt to neutralize checks and balances and stifle pluralism.
Tunisia depends on international cooperation: European Union, IMF, World Bank, bilateral cooperation.
The sovereignist argument is now used to centralize political legitimacy and weaken independent players - trade unions, media, associations, rights defenders.

6. The risks: a gradual dismantling of the democratic framework and institutional legality

• Legal risk: challenge to Decree-Law 88, the foundation of freedom of association.
• Political risk: erosion of checks and balances and re-establishment of total state control over civil society.
• Social risk: loss of a vital humanitarian, health and environmental assistance network.
• International risk: diplomatic isolation and suspension of several cooperation and institutional support programs.

7. CRLDHT recommendations 

To the Tunisian State 

1. Comply fully with the provisions of Decree-Law 2011-88 and its procedural guarantees.
2. Publish the CTAF and Cour des Comptes reports used in investigations, and allow for adversarial debate.
3. Immediately lift freezes and suspensions imposed without judicial review.
4. Put an end to prosecutions of humanitarian and human rights associations.
5. Publicly reaffirm that foreign funding of associations, declared and transparent, is a legal right.

International partners 

1. Make bilateral aid conditional on the effective guarantee of freedom of association.
2. Support the creation of an independent mechanism for the regulation and transparency of the associative sector.
3. Strengthen protection for defenders and associations exposed to reprisals.

To Tunisian civil society 

1. Strengthen transparency and financial reporting.
2. Pool legal and media resources to defend the sector collectively.
3. Coordinate advocacy actions with international bodies and Tunisia's partners.

8. conclusion 

Tunisia is going through a critical phase in which the rhetoric of sovereignty is being used to restrict public freedoms.
Yet freedom of association and international cooperation are pillars of democratic sovereignty.
Declared foreign funding, framed by law, is neither a threat nor a crime - it's an instrument of development and openness.

The CRLDHT calls on the Tunisian authorities to put an immediate stop to the criminalization of associations, to restore legality and to honor the country's international commitments.
Sovereignty cannot be defended against civil society: it must be built with it.