A Cesarean section after a prolonged pregnancy
Accused by Kaïs Saïed of all manner of evils—notably the erosion of the state—the municipalities, as a level of decentralized government, did not sit well with the new dictator. He did not hesitate to terminate the term of the mayor of Bizerte, who had opposed the city’s beautification efforts ahead of the presidential visit on October 15, 2022. The mayor had stated that this decision was linked to his refusal to decorate the streets for the visit. He claimed he had wanted to preserve municipal funds and respond to residents’ calls.
In March 2023, Presidential Decree-Law No. 2023-9 dissolved all municipal councils and entrusted the leadership and day-to-day management of municipal affairs to their secretaries-general, under the supervision of the governors (Ministry of the Interior).
Without dwelling on the unconstitutional nature of this legislation, it put an end to the very idea that formed the basis of elected municipalities. But this dissolution was presented as temporary.
A temporary situation that nevertheless lasted quite a while. After several years without municipal elections, the ISIE justified the lack of elections by citing the incompatibility of the Local Government Code with the Constitution. As if the legal frameworks of other institutions—the presidency foremost among them, or even the ISIE itself—were, in fact, in compliance with the Constitution.
Despite the formal institutional framework established by Kaïs Saïed’s regime—notably the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP), which is responsible for passing laws—the President of the Republic chose to issue a decree-law. It should be noted, however, that Article 75 of the 2022 Constitution lists the matters falling under organic laws without explicitly mentioning the organization of local governments. The Constitution does, however, provide in Article 133 that local governments are governed by elected councils. Decree-Law No. 4-2026 was published in the Official Gazette after the ARP’s General Legislation Committee was notified, although the committee did not adopt it.
This latest presidential move, announced just a few days before the start of the parliamentary session, therefore raises questions about its legitimacy and compliance with constitutional principles. It seems obvious to point out once again the disregard for the hierarchy of legal norms and general principles of law, which Kaïs Saïed has made a habit of trampling on. The president will not even tolerate the ARP’s subsequent approval of his decree-laws, even though such approval might, in principle, be necessary for them to remain in force.
A decree-law that raises the specter of a municipality
Decree-Law No. 4-2026 makes its intent clear right from the title: it concerns “city councils,” not municipalities, unlike Book II of the Local Government Code (CCL), which it repeals.
Article 1 of the new presidential decree makes no secret of the new conception of these councils or their nature. The guiding principle—autonomous administration, set forth in Article 1 of the CCL—has been omitted from the new decree-law. The decree-law stipulates that the municipal council is a local government entity endowed with legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy “as provided by law.” It entrusts the municipal council with the management of municipal affairs “within the framework of the unity of the State” and stipulates that its actions must be in harmony with the State’s strategic decisions.
This autonomy is therefore limited by government regulations and guidelines: in other words, the councils have little real leeway in their strategic decisions and management, which must remain in line with decisions made at the national level. This raises questions about the institution’s classification and nature, given that it is considered an autonomous local government.
A reading of the decree-law then reveals a “resurrection”—but that of Law No. 33-1975 of May 14, 1975, enacting the Statute of Municipalities, and not that of Organic Law No. 29-2018 on the Local Government Code. This is where the allegory of the ghost takes on its full meaning.
The Governor's Revenge
The history of local government in Tunisia is also a history of struggle—and even power struggles—between the governor—who represents the central government—and the president of the municipal council, or mayor, who represents decentralized and local government.
The governor held the upper hand under Law No. 33-1975 of May 14, 1975, and even before that. It was an authoritarian regime at the time, whether under Bourguiba or Ben Ali, despite a few superficial changes prior to 2011. Of course, there was no question of granting citizens any power, even symbolic power: in the mindset of the time, that would have been perceived as a sign of weakness, or even as a danger.
During the transition to democracy, the Local Government Code was adopted in 2018. It profoundly reformed decentralization by putting into practice the principles enshrined in the 2014 Constitution. From a theoretical and conceptual standpoint, the revolution was palpable; its implementation, however, was at times clumsy and chaotic, due to flaws in the text and a lack of resources.
In the balance of power between the mayor and the governor, the mayor and the city council had never enjoyed such a high degree of independence, in accordance with the principle of self-government. The governor exercised control through judicial review: it was up to the administrative judge to settle disputes and conflicts.
Under the new legislation, the governor once again becomes a supervisory authority—and even more than that. Article 22 provides that the governor is informed of the agenda and may attend meetings or send a representative. The governor may also request that additional items be added to the agenda, which must then be included. The CCL, on the other hand, did not provide for the governor’s attendance at city council meetings.
The governor may hear the mayor or one of his or her deputies before the Minister of the Interior decides on the mayor’s suspension or removal from office. The suspension may last up to three months, and these provisions do not provide for any request for a stay of execution [2].
The governor’s report may also serve as the basis for the dissolution of the entire city council by decree, or for its temporary suspension by the Minister of the Interior [3].
City council resolutions become enforceable one month after they are filed with the governorate [4]. A list of acts—including the budget, zoning plans, loans, fees, and agreements—requires the governor’s prior approval [5].
The governor’s objection suspends the enforcement of the decision. If the council refuses to reconsider it, the governor overturns it himself [6]: he therefore does not even need to refer the matter to an administrative judge after the fact. The decree-law also grants him the authority to intervene in cases where municipal decisions are difficult to implement [7].
The governor must approve the city council’s budget following a discussion; in certain situations specified by the decree-law, the governor may also intervene in the budget’s formulation [8].
These examples are enough to show that the governor’s influence over the city council is such that it would be an understatement to speak of mere supervisory authority. Rather, it is a direct authority—which can be described as “presidential power” in administrative law—that is taking hold.
The local referendum among the victims
The local referendum, provided for in Articles 31 through 33 of the CCL, was an innovative procedure that gave concrete expression to the principle of direct and active citizen participation in local management and governance. The new decree-law does not include this participatory mechanism, even though it is compatible with the vague presidential program of “building from the ground up.”
Entry into force
The new decree-law will take effect after the final results of the first municipal elections held following its publication are announced. Until then, the provisions of Decree-Law No. 2023-9 of March 8, 2023, which dissolved the municipal councils, remain in effect. This rule is set forth in Article 136 of the new text [9].
However, this does not mean that these elections are imminent. As of November 11, 2026, the ISIE stated that it was ready to organize them and had proposed holding the election in the spring of 2027, but it was still awaiting the publication of the presidential decree calling for the election. According to the electoral law, this call to the polls is issued by presidential decree. Therefore, at this stage, the ISIE has not abandoned its role in organizing the election, but is awaiting the decree necessary to launch the electoral process. Nevertheless, the date depends on the president’s decision to call voters to the polls.
The free fall continues
This rollback of participatory mechanisms, just like the enshrinement of the governor’s supremacy, betrays the text’s repressive and monopolistic spirit. Once again, there is no question of allowing citizens—the people or the “rank and file,” to use President Saïed’s own terminology—any leeway for self-governance or decision-making free from the prior and subsequent oversight of the central authority, which is monopolized by the President of the Republic.
This is yet another blow to the rule of law in Tunisia and a new step in the dismantling of the gains of the 2011 revolution by Kaïs Saïed and his regime, who embody the anti-revolution.
[1] Independent High Electoral Authority.
[2] Articles 51 and 52 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[3] Article 56 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[4] Article 29 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[5] Article 30 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[6] Articles 31 and 32 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[7] Article 46 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[8] Articles 75 and 76 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
[9] Article 136 of Decree-Law No. 4-2026.
