The Context: Violations of Several Human Rights
In accordance with their mandates and alarmed by the erosion of safeguards for human rights and the rule of law in Tunisia, several United Nations special procedures mandate holders sent a joint communication to the Tunisian authorities, reference AL TUN 1/2026, dated February 6, 2026. This communication followed several allegations of human rights violations. It was signed by the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association, and the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders.
It involved judges Anissa Trichili and Afif Jaidi, attorneys Ayachi Hammami, Ahmed Souab, Abir Moussi, and Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, as well as journalist Chaima Issa.
The line: “Move along, there’s nothing to see here.”
The brief examined in this article was filed on May 7, 2026. It addresses the independence of the judiciary (I), the situation of certain judges (II), the so-called “conspiracy against state security” case ” (III), the case of Attorney Ahmed Souab (IV), the case of Attorney Abir Moussi (V), conditions of detention in correctional facilities (VI), and the measures taken to ensure that lawyers and human rights defenders can work in Tunisia in a supportive environment (VII).
In about fifty pages, the regime—unsurprisingly—denies all allegations of human rights violations outright, without even presenting a legal argument on the disputed points or addressing the evidence that lends credence to the victims’ allegations and the experts’ concerns.
As if this were a Universal Periodic Review before the Human Rights Council, the Tunisian authorities are citing laws and provisions that they themselves describe as compliant with constitutional and treaty standards. They assert that the laws are enforced in an exemplary manner by both the executive and the judiciary. This attitude—characteristic of dictatorships and autocratic regimes in their dealings with the relevant UN institutions since 1945—is accompanied by hollow and outrageous rhetoric, so far removed is it from reality.
What's surprising
While the form and content of the Tunisian regime’s so-called response come as no surprise to anyone, one thing is nonetheless surprising: this regime is still responding to UN human rights mechanisms, even though it has not deigned to respond to the reports filed by victims of arbitrary arrests.
Before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Tunisian regime has turned a deaf ear in recent years. Yet there is no shortage of cases: those of Ghazi Chaouachi, Jawhar Ben Mbarek, Ridha Belhaj, Chaima Issa, Mohamed Khayem Turki, Abdelhamid Jlassi, Issam Chebbi, Béchir Akremi, Abir Moussi, and Rached Ghannouchi, among others.
In all these cases, the Working Group concluded that the detention was arbitrary, for several reasons. The Tunisian government, however, has not responded, as if this attitude were part of a policy—or, at the very least, a deliberate choice by the authorities. The authorities are even less willing to comply with these decisions, even though they are legally obligated to do so. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, these decisions remain unimplemented, even though they restore, at least in principle, a form of justice.
Monotony, Absurdity, and Denial
On the various issues addressed, the Tunisian authorities’ response always follows the same pattern. First, they list a series of laws and provisions to assert that everything is exemplary and fully in line with human rights. Next, regarding individual cases, they list the judicial or disciplinary proceedings initiated against the individuals concerned, as if the issue were simply a matter of determining which proceedings they are facing. Then they deny any irregularities or reprisals in the proceedings and conclude that everything is legal and runs like clockwork.
The absurdity of the response becomes clear when it acknowledges, for example, that judges Anissa Trichili and Afif Jaidi are being investigated by the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice for having commented on a court ruling. According to the authorities, these comments allegedly violate their duty of neutrality. If we adhere to this conception of neutrality, judges would simply have to remain silent to avoid prosecution.
Even more absurd: more than two years after the events, the two judges have still not been brought before a disciplinary body or acquitted. This is a peculiar interpretation of respect for the guarantees of judicial independence: judges remain under investigation for years, without their cases being resolved.
In their response, the Tunisian authorities also dare to portray as fair the sham trials endured by those prosecuted in the so-called “conspiracy against state security” case—including Abir Moussi and attorney Ahmed Souab—as part of this rushed trial. This comes despite the fact that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly denounced the manipulation of the Tunisian justice system to suppress political dissidents.
As previously noted, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has repeatedly condemned arbitrary detentions in Tunisia, notably those of Attorney Moussi and Chaima Issa. The authorities are ignoring these decisions, just as they ignored the order for provisional measures issued in Case No. 04/2023 before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in which it was established through adversarial proceedings that the Tunisian State had violated the most basic rights of the female detainees.
The Tunisian authorities also see no problem with invoking Decree-Law No. 11-2022 and presenting it as a guarantee of the judiciary’s independence. However, it is precisely because of the violation of this independence that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ordered, in its Judgment No. 16/2021, the annulment of this law. In Case No. 008/2024, the Court ordered Tunisia to suspend the application of Decree-Law No. 35-2022. This decree-law makes Tunisia one of the few countries in the world where the President of the Republic can remove a judge without cause or prior proceedings, while automatically referring the judge to a criminal court.
Through this denial and this blatant disconnect from reality, the regime is confirming to the relevant U.N. bodies that it considers Chaima Issa, Ayachi Hammami, Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, and Ahmed Souab to be terrorists who sought to conspire to overthrow the regime through criminal acts. The same applies to Abir Moussi, who is being prosecuted in other cases.
Without addressing the specific facts and legal issues raised in the submission to which it is supposed to respond, the reply hides behind the “judicial function”—the judicial branch, according to the 2022 Constitution—and claims that the judiciary is independent. It thus relies on legal provisions that only serve to demonstrate contempt for the very principles whose violation the brief denounces, in an irrational contradiction.
The Contradiction
In a striking contrast that borders on the ridiculous, the Tunisian regime—in its eagerness to demonstrate just how much it respects the independence of the judiciary—continues to cite a law dating back to the middle of the last century: Organic Law No. 67-29 of July 17, 1967, concerning the judicial system, the High Council of the Judiciary, and the status of the judiciary.
This law, which has historically curtailed civil liberties and undermined the institutional and individual independence of judges, has been denounced by generations of judges, lawyers, and human rights activists. It has been criticized throughout the history of the Tunisian judiciary. A review of successive reports from the Universal Periodic Review on Tunisia, as well as reports from national and international NGOs, demonstrates the extent to which this law has cemented the executive branch’s dominance over the Tunisian judiciary.
It was therefore in keeping with the course of history and the will of the people that the 2014 Constitution broke radically with this approach and conception of the judiciary, seeking to enshrine its independence—both institutional and professional. Organic Law No. 34/2016 of April 28, 2016, on the High Council of the Judiciary gave concrete form—albeit not without some missteps—to this new conception of the judiciary. It provided Tunisia—and the entire region—with the first elected and independent High Judicial Council, as well as safeguards for judges that, at least in their broad outlines, were in line with the most advanced legislation in this area.
The coup d’état of July 25, 2021, destroyed these achievements. Presidential Decree-Law No. 11-2022 first repealed the provisions of the 2014 Constitution and those of the Organic Law, in a reversal of the hierarchy of norms that was both illegal and illegitimate. This decree dissolved the elected Council and established a provisional council whose members are appointed directly or indirectly by the President of the Republic, at the cost of gross interference by the executive branch in the powers of the so-called High Council. These violations led to Judgment No. 16/2021 of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which ordered the annulment of this law.
The president then drove the point home with another decree-law, one that was even more exceptional in form than in content: Decree-Law No. 35-2022, which, a few months later, amended Decree-Law No. 11-2022. The President of the Republic granted himself the power to remove any judge from office without cause or adherence to any prior procedure. A judge who has been removed may challenge his or her removal only after a final decision has been rendered by the criminal courts before which he or she is automatically brought simply by virtue of that removal.
President Kaïs Saïed used this text on the very day of its publication to dismiss 57 judges, without providing any justification for his decisions, which were consolidated into a single decree. Even those who had obtained stays of execution from the president of the Administrative Court were not reinstated. It was rightly so that, in its Order on Provisional Measures No. 008/2024, the African Court ordered Tunisia to suspend the application of these two decrees even before ruling on the merits of the case.
It goes without saying that the Tunisian regime’s response makes no mention of these blatant abuses or these shameful episodes of persecution of judges and the terror inflicted on others.
The Tunisian authorities’ deliberate turning a blind eye is all the more serious because it is not limited to justifying their stance with these new, regressive laws. They even go so far as to boast about enforcing an obsolete law—first of all, because it has been repealed, either explicitly or tacitly, by subsequent laws that are incompatible with it.
The purported revival of the 1967 Organic Law is also unconstitutional, whether one refers to the 2014 Constitution or even the 2022 Constitution, with all its shortcomings.
The regime’s response confirms that it intends to enforce the laws that all legislation passed after the revolution had sought to set aside. It presents as acceptable the fact that the Minister of Justice issues memos almost daily to transfer, suspend, or discipline judges because of judicial decisions that do not align with the regime’s decrees.
The presidential slogan that has been hammered home since the 2021 coup—"No to going backward"—once again reveals its limitations. It even reveals the opposite of what it claims to defend, much like the slogans brandished by this counterrevolution that dares not speak its name.
Unless, by some miracle, the regime can convince the UN experts that the erosion of judicial independence constitutes progress, its response betrays its inability to present serious arguments—even partial ones. It also reveals the lack of a systematic and institutional pattern in the human rights violations of which it is accused, whether in this submission or in other proceedings. Both the regime’s responses and its silences reflect only one attitude: denial and irresponsibility.
