This is law no. 9/2025 on the organization of trail and the prohibition of subcontracting, published in the JORT on May 23, 2025, and passed at dawn on May 21, 2025, in accordance with presidential tradition, amending the Labor Code. It was a presidential project and therefore a priority, not only procedurally, as required by the Constitution, but also substantively: out of 125 representatives of the Assembly of People's Representatives (ARP), 121 voted in favor of the text and 4 abstained. Of course, there were no votes against: the ARP is more than ever a mere rubber stamp for presidential legislation.

TENEUR

The fixed-term employment contract (CDD) is no longer an option: it is an exception to the principle, which becomes that of the open-ended contract (CDI). This principle is enshrined in a number of comparative legislative texts, but it is the tolerated cases of this exception that may give rise to debate as to the appropriateness of these measures.

From now on, the use of fixed-term contracts can only be legal in the case of :

• An abnormal increase in the volume of services or work;
• Temporary replacement for a regular employee who is absent or whose contract has expired;
• Seasonal work;
• Other cases that the CDI cannot contain.

Fixed-term contracts can only be drawn up in writing, with the same compulsory details as those already in force. What's new is the obligation to indicate the exceptional circumstances that justify recourse to a fixed-term contract. Failing this, the contract becomes an open-ended contract.

This reform may be acceptable - indeed, it seems to be inspired by the choices made in French labor law - but one provision remains exorbitant and illogical: all current fixed-term contracts that do not correspond to the new exceptions are deemed to be open-ended contracts from the date of publication of the text, including those terminated before March 14, 2025. Reconversion is not in itself a new technique, but it is its sudden and general aspect that makes the provision exorbitant.
Employees recruited by subcontracting in offices, industrial, commercial and agricultural public establishments are also deemed to be tenured from the date of publication.

Labor subcontracting is defined in the new law as any contract or agreement between a company employing labor and a recipient company, for which the labor is "rented" and made available by the employing company. The concept also applies to security and cleaning workers.

Violation of these standards is penalized:

• Fine of 10,000 dinars for individuals,
• 200,000 dinars for legal entities,
• 10,000 dinars for the legal representatives or managers of the beneficiary company.
  In the event of a repeat offence, the penalty is a prison sentence of 3 to 6 months.
  But it should be noted that in these cases of infringement of the law, the employer cannot continue to operate. Unemployment thus becomes the alternative to precarious work.

Service companies may no longer intervene in the beneficiary company's core business. The only activities tolerated are those requiring professional skills or advanced technical specialization.
Recipient companies must ensure that the rights of workers employed by service companies are respected, becoming responsible for the application of labor legislation. This control extends to verifying the service company's reporting obligations.

In terms of reform methodology, this law - if it is a reform at all - is sporadic and partial. It places the legislator in a posture of reaction and tinkering, rather than one of construction.
It aims to put an end to the concept introduced into the Tunisian Labor Code in the 1990s, namely the notion of thecompany's interest, an overhaul then integrated into a global vision of the development model and economic reform.
Whatever the criticisms levelled at these past reforms, they were part of a coherent design. The new text, on the other hand, was parachuted in by the President of the Republic without any social debate or societal vision, and without any economic reflection, either micro or macro. No commissions, no statistics, no impact studies. An empiricism from another age, reminiscent of medieval monarchies and in keeping with the messianism that Kaïs Saïed seems to ascribe to himself.

From a legal and economic point of view, the intervention, formally legislative, tramples on a number of principles.

• Legal phenomena, which are supposed to organize social reality, can also influence it. But to do so, it must respect the general principles of law and the balance between - necessarily contradictory - subjective rights.

With regard to general legal principles

• The amendment to the Labor Code ignores contractual consensualism and turns the employment relationship into an institution. This in itself strengthens the protection of the employee, deemed to be the weaker party in a contract of adhesion.
• But by suddenly converting fixed-term contracts into open-ended ones, legal certainty is undermined - not just in the employment relationship, but in the general concept of contracts.
• The unpredictability associated with the law's retroactivity has catastrophic repercussions on investment, both internal and external. It also jeopardizes wealth creation, in the absence of concrete alternatives, which the President is constantly invoking.

Concerning the imbalance of subjective rights

• While the text aims to remedy abuses linked to fixed-term contracts and subcontracting, it creates new imbalances.
• In an attempt to "rebalance", the legislator is generalizing precariousness, without taking into account the economic reality of employers.
• Comparing banks or insurance companies to small or medium-sized enterprises struggling to survive is a monumental methodological error.
• There is no support for employers: no assistance, no credit line, and no assessment of the impact on performance or competitiveness - national or international.

The approach adopted is based on a simplistic reading of the relationship between two parties - one oppressive, the other oppressed - waiting for the presidential savior.
No place is given to the interests of the company, which were at the heart of the 1996 reform.
In this law, the company is reduced to an entity to be monitored, no longer a generator of wealth or employment.

CONCLUSION

Kaïs Saïed's quest for "social" achievements takes precedence over legal and economic considerations. This text meets propagandist and populist needs.
By claiming to fight against social precariousness, it risks generalizing it to all companies.
The automatic extension to public entities, by giving tenure to workers on precarious contracts without providing for a budget - when they are already over-indebted - demonstrates once again the incantatory and irresponsible nature of this law.

It risks creating insurmountable obstacles for employers, holding back investment and undermining employability. Once again, Kaïs Saïed seems intent on undermining the ground for his successors - unless he pushes employers towards robotization or the informal economy.

But it's the parallel sector that will emerge stronger. Unless the President makes an improbable U-turn - he who claims that this text is a feat greeted by popular jubilation.
And even if he has often modified his own texts, it will be difficult to turn back the clock in time.

In the texts he considers emblematic and universal - such as the penal transaction or community companies - he remains faithful to his dead horse theory: if it doesn't work, it's because there are plotters in the shadows.
And since he promises other texts of the same ilk, the staging of popular jubilation is likely to go on for a while yet.