Tunisia, often seen as a model of democratic transition following the 2011 revolution, now faces major challenges in preserving its fundamental freedoms, notably freedom of association. The 2023 annual report of the Instance Supérieure de contrôle administratif et financier (ISCAF) highlights proposals and mechanisms which, under the pretext of guaranteeing financial transparency and good governance, risk stifling associative vitality. Here is a detailed analysis of these risks:

I. excessive centralization of control over foreign financing of associations

The report proposes centralizing data on foreign funding of associations through close coordination between the main institutions: the Central Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for International Cooperation and the General Administration of Associations under the presidency of the government. The aim of this centralization would be to monitor financial flows to ensure compliance with legal obligations and transparency.

On the surface, this approach may seem legitimate, but it masks a major danger: the possibility of political control. Indeed, under the guise of regulation, this system could be used to target associations perceived as opposing or critical of the government.

The centralization of information could lead to real-time monitoring and discretionary decisions to suspend or dissolve associations. This excessive control could dissuade some donors from supporting associations in Tunisia, for fear of reprisals or administrative complications.

II. Building a national database of foreign-funded associations: a double-edged sword

The report recommends setting up a regularly updated national database, linking information from several institutions (Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Center of Registers, etc.) on associations receiving foreign funding.

If used in a non-transparent way, this database could become a repressive tool for tracking and targeting associations according to their source of funding. The risk is that this surveillance could lead to unjustified restrictions on associative freedoms, notably through the suspension or dissolution of organizations on the basis of suspicions of "non-compliance".

Associations working in sensitive areas, such as the defense of human rights or the promotion of democracy, could be targeted under the pretext of non-compliant foreign funding.

The simple fear of being monitored could lead some associations to censor themselves or limit their activities, which would considerably weaken civil society.

III. Greater control over banks and financial institutions: the role of banks as supervisory agents

The report encourages banks to play an active role in monitoring the financial flows of associations. Banks would be responsible for reporting any suspicious transactions, and could even be called upon to block funds if they feel that transparency requirements are not being met.
This role entrusted to banks places financial institutions in the position of agents of the state, which may prompt them to preemptively restrict associations' access to their funds. This situation creates a risk of financial paralysis for the targeted organizations.

An overly broad or ambiguous interpretation of transparency rules could lead banks to block funds from associations without any legitimate reason. Associations that depend on foreign funding for their projects run the risk of no longer being able to function properly.

IV. Revision of the legal framework for associations: A possible regression in freedoms

The report calls for a revision of Decree-Law no. 88 of 2011, which governs the creation and activities of associations in Tunisia. Although this text is considered to be one of the pillars of associative freedom after the revolution, the report suggests tightening certain provisions, particularly those relating to financial transparency.
If this revision is oriented towards tighter control, it could introduce new restrictions limiting the ability of associations to operate freely. It could also give the authorities additional pretexts for sanctioning associations under the guise of "non-compliance with financial standards". The new rules could make it easier to dissolve or suspend associations, even for simple administrative errors. Complex procedures and the risk of sanctions could discourage the creation of new associations, thus reducing the diversity of civil society.

V. slow progress on reforms and threats of intensified controls

The report reveals that the rate of implementation of recommended reforms concerning the supervision of foreign financing is only 4%. This slowness is perceived as a major problem, prompting the Forum to recommend intensifying control and coordination efforts between the various state entities. This finding could justify even more drastic measures in the future, with the risk of increased repression under the pretext of "speeding up reforms". The authorities could introduce new laws or regulations aimed at simplifying control procedures and widening their scope of application. Associations could find themselves with limited means of challenging administrative decisions.

VI. Threats to small local associations

The report also highlights the fact that the majority of associations receiving foreign funding are small local structures. These associations, often ill-equipped to cope with increased scrutiny, could be the first victims of this system. Small associations generally do not have the human or financial resources to comply with complex administrative requirements. This exposes them to unfair sanctions: Many small associations could be forced to close due to administrative constraints. This is already the case. The disappearance of small structures would lead to a loss of diversity in local initiatives.

Conclusion: a suffocating control system

The report by the Instance Supérieure de Contrôle Administrative et Financière proposes measures which, although presented under the prism of transparency and good governance, in reality constitute a direct threat to freedom of association in Tunisia. If applied without safeguards, these measures risk stifling civil society, and reinforcing state control over critical voices. Tunisia thus runs the risk of tipping towards a model of governance in which freedom of association, although guaranteed by the Constitution, would be no more than a theoretical principle, emptied of its substance.