The diversionary tactics employed by the current regime in Tunisia under the guise of populist rhetoric conceal its true intentions, which are betrayed by the texts published in the Journal officiel de la République tunisienne (JORT). We will regularly analyze the texts that reveal the nebulous policies raging in various fields.

We will focus on two texts published in October 2024: decree-law no. 3-2024 (1) and decree 497-2024 (2).

1. Legislative decree no. 3 -2024 [1] "decriminalizing the unjustified possession of cash equal to or exceeding 10,000 Dinars".

This decree-law[2] amends law n°54 -2014 of August 19, 2024 relating to the Supplementary Finance Law of 2014 by repealing its article 16 which provided: "Art. 16 - Cash sums equal to or greater than 10,000 dinars whose origin is not justified are seized on the basis of a report drawn up by the agents hereinafter mentioned: - officers of the judicial police, - customs agents, - agents of the Ministry of Finance duly empowered for this purpose. The sums seized are deposited, by order of the Public Prosecutor and within a period not exceeding 72 hours, at the General Treasury of Tunisia or the regional treasury with territorial jurisdiction. Seizure, prosecution and litigation procedures are subject to the provisions of the Customs Code. The amount mentioned in the first paragraph of this article is reduced to 5,000 dinars as from January 1, 2016.". The measures repealed were taken as part of the policy of transparency and the fight against money laundering, terrorist financing and tax fraud, especially as Tunisia was classified in the grey list of the FATF group (Financial Action Task Force International). The trend was to minimize the use of cash. In fact, there was talk of lowering these sums to 3,000 dinars. The reality on the ground is that many craftsmen and farmers have had their money extorted by police and National Guard agents, especially when harvesting and selling their agricultural produce or livestock, which is done in cash. Unable, of course, to call the agents of the State to order, Kaies Saied preferred to repeal the provisions of the law, much to the delight of players in the informal sector and traffickers of all kinds. In the absence of any public debate, it is very difficult to understand the background to this decree. One thing is certain: the President did not wait for the start of the parliamentary session scheduled for October 29, and has promulgated a small measure that is not part of any vision or strategy. What's more, should the FATF make its presence felt, President Saïed will have no qualms about retro-pedaling on the issue.

• Decree no. 497-2024 on special forms and procedures for the execution of major projects[3]

The current regime is not very forthcoming about its programs for reforming and revitalizing the Tunisian economy. This text could be a piece in the puzzle of its reform vision for the economic and administrative sectors. The question is: is this a novelty, or rather an admission of ineffectiveness? One thing is certain: President Saied's vision and actions, and the remedies he is imposing, are resulting in more bureaucracy and less transparency - conditions that are conducive to corruption.

As for the novelty of the idea, it's not novel at all, since it involves resurrecting the "Major Projects Committee" created under the presidency of Ben Ali, who put his advisor at its head. This body was implicated in the large-scale corruption pinpointed by the report of the Truth and Dignity Commission (published on the same date). The new committee, on the other hand, has been assigned to the Prime Ministry, whose status under the 2022 constitution differs little from that of Ben Ali's advisors.

It should also be pointed out that this is not the first time that President Saied has attempted such a resurrection, since on October 19, 2022, he published decree-law 68-2022 concerning special provisions for improving the efficiency of public and private project implementation. This is mentioned in the preamble to the new text, which partially reproduces the content of the aforementioned decree-law 2022. Two years after the text modifying a number of rules relating to PPP[4], a new text has been introduced to modify administrative procedures for major projects, which also include PPP, even if the content of the text covers all public projects. But more important from a political point of view is the discrediting of President Saied after two years of acerbic and critical speeches during his visits, especially on the occasion of his disguised election campaign. He attacked lobbies accused of corruption for allying themselves with his detractors in Tunisia and abroad to freeze or even abort major projects, when it turns out that administrative procedures and their handling by the government are lacking. This is yet another example of the unconventional, if not haphazard, way in which post-July 25, 2021 Tunisia is governed.

But what is the answer provided by this decree-law, which is supposed to revitalize the major projects[5] underway or frozen? It goes without saying that there are many reasons for this, but it's safe to say that they are essentially due to bureaucracy and corruption.

Paradoxically, the remedies prescribed by President Saïed in his decree-law boil down to more bureaucracy and fewer anti-corruption measures.

As far as bureaucracy is concerned, the new text adds a new administrative commission to the numerous commissions already involved in these projects, without even attempting to harmonize them, which increases the risk of positive or negative conflicts of competence and hence delays. Article 3 of Legislative Decree 68-2022 already created such a commission: "A higher commission named 'Higher Commission for Accelerating the Completion of Public Projects', chaired by the Head of Government or his representative, is hereby created, with the task of finding appropriate solutions to accelerate the completion of public projects, and taking measures to overcome any difficulties encountered". Curiously, article 3 of the new text provides for the creation of a "major projects commission" within the Prime Minister's office, chaired by the Head of Government and made up of ministers and the Governor of the Central Bank. The composition of the commission created by the previous decree-law was decided by order of the head of government on June 13, 2023 [6], and also includes ministers (article 3), technical commissions (articles 7 and 8) and sector commissions (articles 12, 13 and 14). The issue is further complicated by the fact that the powers assigned to the two commissions are almost identical.

Article 4 of the new text, for example, stipulates that in its opinion on the awarding of public contracts, the commission must take account of article 5 of decree-law 2022, which exempts the public contracts it governs from prior controls. Article 10 of Decree-Law 2024 seems to provide some elements of an answer, stating that major unfrozen projects for which a call for tenders has been announced or negotiations begun remain governed by the texts in force. So the only certainty we have is that for this type of project, the new text is not retroactive, and conversely,it is retroactive for frozen projects and even for those that have been terminated. With all that this may entail for the rights of third parties and the dependence of the Tunisian judiciary.

As far as transparency and anti-corruption measures are concerned, it would be appropriate simply to mention the provisions of the text which reflect the rather illogical conception of the legislator, in this case Kais Saied. Indeed, he considers a priori control and transparency of administrative procedures as obstacles to the efficiency of the administration's work. Thus, opacity and the lightening, not to say the annihilation, of anti-corruption measures would, according to him, be the appropriate remedy, acting like a fox in a henhouse.

Few control measures are set out in the text, such as article 3, which assigns to the "permanent secretariat of the commission" the task of verifying the legality of procedures relating to the conclusion of project contracts and their conformity with the applicable regulatory texts. A secretariat that controls its own body and its acts, a sort of a posteriori self-control. Article 9 also sets out another form of a posteriori control , that of public expenditure control services and state auditors, which is a formal conformity control and not necessarily an opportunity control.

Article 6 of the decree-law illustrates this strange conception. Although its^1st paragraph states that "public contracts concluded to carry out major public projects shall respect the principles of efficiency, timeliness, competition, transparency and equal opportunity" - we wouldn't ask for more - the other paragraphs of article 6 seem to derive from another text, given the possibilities or opportunities they offer. -The other paragraphs of article 6 seem to derive from another text, given the possibilities or opportunities they offer for corruption and mismanagement. The article specifies that the administration may have recourse to technical assistance offices throughout the process of concluding and carrying out contracts. Already, this possibility is not well defined, but the most serious aspect of article 6 is the possible ways of concluding contracts. It puts forward three forms, which are in fact not all that different, especially when it comes to the arbitrariness of choice and the opacity of procedures, which violate the principles of equality, opportunity, competition and transparency, as well as citizens' right to information.

The first form is direct negotiation with an economic agent chosen according to evasive, imprecise or even impressionistic criteria. The text specifies that this applies to projects concluded within the framework of bilateral or multilateral international cooperation, unless otherwise stipulated in the agreement. In other words, the Tunisian State does not insist on transparency and good governance procedures unless the other parties insist on them; this augurs well for drifts and imbalances, as well as doubts as to which entities are likely to contract under these conditions. To be precise, this provision generalizes the solution adopted in article 5 of decree-law 68 -2022: "Public contracts financed by external financing bodies and institutions are exempt from prior control by public procurement control commissions".

The public contracts referred to in this article remain subject to other control mechanisms in accordance with current legislation and regulations. 

This procedure also applies to "public contracts financed by external funding agencies and institutions that have been put out to tender on the date of publication of this decree-law".

It's true that, from a political point of view, these provisions pay little heed to the sovereignism so hammered home in President Saied's speech, since in the event of foreign financing, prior control mechanisms must be eclipsed. President Saied persists, extending these measures or this exemption to all major projects, or at least those considered as such by the new commission.

The second form is consultation, a very practical and widespread form of corruption in Tunisia. It consists of choosing an economic agent who is an accomplice, who then chooses two or more other economic agents who will formally participate. This fraud may even involve several violations of competition law, as well as of public procurement and administrative law.

The third form is direct negotiation preceded by a preliminary choice. It is difficult to see the difference with the first form, except to consider that the already broad and imprecise selection criteria of the first form are no longer applicable, which would be even more serious.

But the violations instituted by Article 6 are not limited to the aforementioned provisions. As the icing on the cake, the article adds that these contracts are exempt from the obligation to be published in the "TUNEPS" online public purchasing software, and from the preliminary control of public procurement commissions.

It couldn't be clearer. The legislator, none other than President Kaïs Saied, remedies bureaucracy with more bureaucracy, and corruption by encouraging it, as he destroys measures of good governance and transparency. Could this dose of populism or anarchy revive the major public projects that have been frozen? The Arab proverb[7] of "remedying evil with evil" cannot be a good remedy in law, let alone in the management of public affairs. Unless, that is, the aims are not what they were intended to be! In any case, article 96 [8] of the penal code seems to have a bright future ahead of it, and the dance between ministerial seats and El Mornaguia prison may well continue...

[1]Decree-law of October 14, 2024, JORT n°126 of October 15, 2024, page 2806.

[2]This is a decree-law issued during the parliamentary vacancy of the ARP.

[3] Decree of October 24, 2024, JORT n°130, pages 5301 to 5303.

[4]Public-private partnership

[5]If the propaganda of the pro-regime media is to be believed, the modest restoration of the Belvedere municipal swimming pool is a case in point.

[6]Order of the Head of Government setting out the remit, composition and operating procedures of the Higher Commission for Accelerating the Implementation of Public Projects, JORT n°63-2023.

[7]It was originally a line of poetry by the famous Arab poet Abu Nawass, replying to those who criticized him for his excessive alcohol consumption.

[8]" Any public or assimilated official, director, member or employee of a local public authority, an association of national interest, a public industrial and commercial establishment, a company in which the State directly or indirectly holds any share of the capital, is punished by ten years' imprisonment and a fine equal to the advantage received or the prejudice suffered by the administration, or of a company belonging to a local authority, entrusted by virtue of his or her position with the sale, purchase, manufacture, administration or custody of any goods whatsoever, who uses his or her position and thereby procures for himself or herself or for a third party an unjustified advantage, causes prejudice to the administration or contravenes the regulations governing these operations with a view to achieving the aforementioned advantage or prejudice. "