The promulgation of the Finance Law 2025, adopted on December 2, 2024 by the Assembly of People's Representatives and on December 4, 2024 by the Assembly of Regions and Districts, then published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia, illustrates worrying methodological and institutional shortcomings. Beyond its immediate economic and fiscal impact, Law no. 48-2024 reveals major structural flaws: a lack of coherent strategic vision and an alarming persistence in the absence of a budget earmarked for the creation of the Constitutional Court, as indeed for the fight against corruption. These three dimensions underline not only the absence of a solid reform project, but also a deliberate weakening of the institutional guarantees essential to the rule of law.

Lack of strategic vision: navigation by sight :

The Finance Act is more than just an annual accounting exercise. It is a declaration of intent and a roadmap for meeting structural, economic, social and institutional challenges. However, the Finance Act 2025 illustrates fragmented and disorganized management, far from an overall strategic framework.

• Spot and surface measurements:

The measures adopted in this law merely respond to immediate problems without addressing their root causes:

• Allocations to small-scale livestock farmers: granting credit to this economic category (article 32) does not solve the structural problem of the low profitability of their activity. In the absence of sectoral policies aimed at restructuring the livestock sector, this initiative runs the risk of turning into additional indebtedness with no lasting benefits.
• Creation of social funds: the creation of a Fonds d'assurance contre la perte d'emploi (job loss insurance fund) (article 17) and a Fonds de protection sociale pour les travailleuses agricoles (social protection fund for female agricultural workers) (article 15) illustrate a desire to respond to urgent social issues, but these measures remain dependent on the often-delayed drafting of implementing decrees and their actual implementation.

These initiatives reflect a minimalist pragmatism, with no link to a long-term vision, which limits their impact and effectiveness.

• A stifling and unbalanced tax system

Tunisia's tax burden has become unbearable for citizens and businesses alike. The 2025 Finance Law accentuates this pressure, ignoring the principles of tax justice enshrined in the 2022 Constitution:

• Increased direct and indirect taxation: the tax policies adopted do not take into account the growing precariousness of taxpayers, and risk further stifling economic initiatives.
• Cutting subsidies: the reduction in budgets allocated to raw materials and essential products, under the pretext of rationalizing expenditure, is aggravating shortages and exacerbating social tensions.

This purely extractive approach illustrates a striking discrepancy between the official rhetoric of social justice and the reality of the measures implemented.

• A persistent illusion of community-based societies

The regime's insistence on promoting community companies as the key economic model (article 56) raises questions. Empirically, these structures have proved ineffective, and their generalization reflects more a political strategy aimed at creating clientelist networks than a serious solution to economic challenges.

No budget for the Constitutional Court: a serious institutional failure

The continued absence of a budget for the Constitutional Court illustrates a deliberate desire to maintain an institutional status quo that favours the concentration of power in the hands of the President.

• An international obligation ignored: in 2022, Tunisia was required by the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights to make the Constitutional Court operational within two years. However, no steps have been taken to meet this obligation, confirming the lack of political will to provide the country with an effective constitutional control body.
• Reinforcement of authoritarianism: the 2022 Constitution, while reducing the independence of the Constitutional Court, nevertheless provides for its existence. However, the persistent refusal to allocate it a budget underlines the regime's determination to free itself from any institutional counterweight. This stalemate consolidates a hyper-presidentialist system, in which the interpretation of texts and their application remain under the exclusive control of the executive.
• A historic step backwards for the rule of law: the absence of the Constitutional Court perpetuates a Tunisian tradition of mistrust of constitutional review. Under Bourguiba, the issue was taboo. Under Ben Ali, the Constitutional Council confined itself to a formal role with no real impact. Today, President Kais Saied's regime is reintroducing this absence of control, but in a context where violations of fundamental rights are exacerbated.

Lack of anti-corruption measures: a glaring inconsistency

The absence of any significant anti-corruption provisions in the Finance Act 2025 raises a major contradiction between official rhetoric and concrete action. In a context where corruption is a constant theme in presidential speeches, this failure highlights a superficial and ineffective approach to an issue that is central to the country's economic and institutional recovery.

• A recurrent theme in political discourse: the President of the Republic and his administration have made the fight against corruption a pillar of their public communications. Frequent denunciations of "economic mafias", "networks of obscure interests" and corrupt practices are omnipresent. However, these declarations, often used for populist purposes, do not translate into concrete policies or measures in fundamental instruments such as the Finance Act.
• A Finance Act disconnected from anti-corruption priorities: the Finance Act 2025 does not include any clear or ambitious measures aimed at combating corruption or improving transparency in the management of public finances. Yet reforms in this area are essential if we are to
• A cynical and passive administration: the administration in charge of preparing the finance law seems to have adopted a cynical posture, by not inserting anti-corruption provisions that could have appeared as empty commitments in the absence of real political will. This choice reflects a certain pragmatism, but also a renunciation in the face of a fundamental problem, contributing to the perpetuation of an opaque and inefficient system.
• A direct impact on the investment climate: The absence of concrete measures to combat this scourge in the Finance Law demonstrates a lack of interest in creating an environment conducive to investment and economic development. This failure sends a negative signal to the international community and Tunisia's economic partners.

For the fight against corruption to become more than just a political slogan, it is imperative to integrate clear and binding mechanisms into legislative and budgetary texts, strengthen independent control institutions and promote a culture of transparency and integrity in public management. Without this, corruption will continue to undermine development efforts and exacerbate social inequalities in Tunisia.