Against a backdrop of economic asphyxia and authoritarian drift, the Liqaet conference on April 9 brought together two political scientists, Hamza Meddeb and Michaël Ayari, to discuss Tunisia's fiscal crisis and exploding public debt. The discussion aimed to decipher the economic, political and social drivers of the current crisis, while questioning the governance of President Kaïs Saied and the capacity of the Tunisian state to reform itself. Two central questions structured the discussion: How can we explain the rise of economic difficulties? And can Tunisia reform in the face of its structural impasses?
It's not just a question of economics, but of democracy, popular sovereignty and social justice. The economic choices made by the current authorities, notably Kaïs Saied, are not neutral. They reflect a vision of the world - authoritarian, opaque, centralized - and betray a disturbing disregard for fundamental rights.
When public debt becomes a political weapon against the people
Hamza Meddeb reminds us that debt is not an evil in itself: it is a political instrument. What counts is how it is used. Indebting a country to build hospitals, strengthen public education or ensure food sovereignty is a radically different choice from indebting it to repay privileged creditors or maintain a regime in power. Debt is a choice for society, and today that choice is one of social regression, the destruction of public services and the casualization of the poorest.
He went back over the historical development of the Tunisian economic model, which began to run out of steam in the 2000s. After a period of moderate growth in the 70s, followed by an upturn in the 90s ("economic miracle" discourse), the 2000s were a period of stagnation. The decade of 2010 was marked by a succession of shocks (terrorism, Covid-19, war in Ukraine), exacerbating structural vulnerabilities: deindustrialization, collapse of tourism, decline in energy production and falling public and private investment.
Today, the country has reached an impasse. Potential growth is extremely low (1% by 2029), investment is collapsing (11.2% of GDP in 2024), and debt is exploding. Central public debt has reached 84% of GDP, and domestic debt exceeds 70 billion dinars. The massive recourse to domestic debt reflects the country's international financial isolation, aggravated by the failure of negotiations with the IMF.
Crony capitalism and the financialization of power
Meddeb also highlighted the dysfunctional role of the Tunisian banking system, where three state-owned banks mainly support loss-making public enterprises. The private sector is dominated by a few family holding companies, which concentrate the bulk of economic flows, control several banks, and enjoy privileged access to credit. Rather than invest in the real economy, these groups prefer to buy public debt, becoming the main creditors of a state they have no interest in reforming. Thus, since 2021, the Tunisian state, cut off from international financing and with no clear economic strategy, has been indebting itself to domestic private players.
This financialization of power is creating a vicious circle: the State is going into debt to contain the social effects of the crisis (inflation, falling real wages, deterioration in public services), while at the same time strangling the private sector, which hampers any economic recovery.
Kaïs Saied and a captive economy
Under the guise of sovereignty, Kaïs Saied imposes an authoritarian and technocratic vision of power, without offering the slightest credible alternative. He rejects reforms and international partnerships, but offers no concrete economic strategy.
By rejecting the IMF without proposing a credible alternative, it further isolates Tunisia, while accentuating its dependence on domestic creditors. This "sovereignism without sovereignty" condemns the country to political isolation, unable to finance its future, and sees the growth of a populism that feeds mistrust.
Tunisia, an irreformable state?
Michaël Ayari took a more direct look at the question of the reformability of the Tunisian state. While the regime may have changed after 2011, the state itself - its structures, its administrative culture, its relationship with the law - has remained static. Bureaucracy blocks any attempt at decentralization or real citizen participation. The current regime is not authoritarian in the classical sense, but operates within a logic of deinstitutionalization, further weakening the State's ability to act.
Tunisian law is instrumentalized, used to silence, punish and block, rather than to guarantee freedoms. It fosters a legal insecurity that hampers all development. Ultra-centralization, heavy bureaucracy and the persistence of clientelism prevent any reform from emerging. In this context, governance is based more on the logic of control than on the production of public goods.
Ayari criticizes a mercantilist and rentier vision of the economy, with no break with the logics of regional exclusion, opaque indebtedness and the rentier economy. He notes the absence of a coherent and credible sovereignist discourse, at a time when the need for food, energy and social security has never been more pressing.
Conclusion: what are the alternatives?
The conference highlighted the scale of Tunisia's economic crisis, but also the need to devise alternatives that are both sustainable and respectful of human rights. Breaking out of the current impasse implies not only structural reform of the State, but also a profound change in economic priorities, breaking with the logics of rent and dependency. This means redirecting debt towards useful investments, rethinking the relationship between the State and its citizens, and giving new meaning to economic sovereignty with a view to social justice.
