The analyses and data presented in this article are taken from conferences and meetings organized in 2025 by the CRLDHT, devoted to budgetary and financial issues and Tunisia's public debt, as well as from documents and presentations shared at these events. Behind the figures on Tunisia's public debt lies a major political and social reality: the gradual suffocation of public services, the erosion of economic and social rights, and the transfer of the burden of the crisis to future generations. This article, based on the debates held by the CRLDHT in 2025, offers a critical reading of debt as a political choice rather than an economic inevitability.

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Tunisia's public debt is neither a surprise nor a hiccup. It is the result of a long trajectory marked by failed economic choices, fragile political compromises and, more recently, authoritarian governance that has turned debt into a permanent means of survival. The meetings organized in 2025 by the CRLDHT made it possible to reconstruct this trajectory and shed light on its deep-rooted origins, beyond the raw figures.

A long-contained debt, an already exhausted model 

Until the early 2000s, Tunisia's public debt remained relatively under control. In 2010, it hovered around 40 to 45% of GDP. However, this apparent stability was based on a fragile economic model: growth driven by low value-added sectors, competitiveness based on low wages, increased dependence on Europe, and chronic underinvestment in inland regions. The debt existed, but it accompanied a model that was running out of steam without ever being questioned.

After 2011, debt as a social buffer

The 2011 revolution marked a turning point. To avoid social collapse, the government resorted to massive borrowing to finance wage increases, subsidies, and support policies. Deficits became structural. At the same time, Tunisia benefited from broad international support: the democratic transition facilitated access to external financing. This "democratic dividend" made it possible to postpone difficult decisions. Debt increased, but reforms of the economic model and the tax system were deferred.

2015–2019: taking on debt without transforming

Starting in 2013, and then especially in 2016, Tunisia embarked on programs with the International Monetary Fund. Debt then exceeded 70% of GDP. The reforms demanded—subsidies, public enterprises, payroll—remained partial, contested, and often blocked. Growth remained weak, investment declined, and debt continued to rise without producing any structural transformation. Debt financed continuity, not change.

The COVID shock and the shift

The Covid-19 pandemic has acted as a brutal accelerator. With tourism collapsing, tax revenues shrinking, and financing needs exploding, debt has jumped from around 72% of GDP in 2019 to nearly 80% in 2021. It is at this point that the government has begun to make exceptional use of the Central Bank of Tunisia, via direct facilities. Debt ceased to be a cyclical instrument and became a tool for budgetary survival.

Since 2021, an acceleration exacerbated by political gridlock

From July 2021 onwards, the situation will spiral out of control. International financial isolation, the lack of an agreement with the IMF, and the concentration of executive power will trap Tunisia in a growing dependence on domestic debt. Public debt rose from around 98 billion dinars in 2021 to 147 billion at the end of 2025, with a projection of close to 157 billion at the end of 2026. In five years, the increase was around 60%. The state borrowed more than it repaid, often to finance its day-to-day operations.

The deep roots of debt

This drift cannot be explained solely by external shocks. It has its origins in chronic deficits fueled by a tax system that is not very progressive and tolerates tax evasion and unearned income. It is also rooted in the collapse of public and private investment, which deprives the economy of growth and makes debt mechanically unsustainable. Finally, the financialization of the state—which has become one of the banks' main customers—diverts national savings from productive investment to public debt.

A debt with serious human consequences

Over the years, debt has become a major constraint on public policy. Debt servicing absorbs an increasing share of resources, to the detriment of health, education, public services, and regional investment. The erosion of purchasing power, the deterioration of infrastructure, and the worsening of regional inequalities are concrete manifestations of this. The burden is being passed on to future generations, who are already facing unemployment and forced exile.

Far from being inevitable, Tunisia's debt is the result of repeated political choices: a lack of ambitious tax reform, a refusal to transform the development model, and authoritarian and opaque management of public finances. Understanding its evolution and origins is not an academic exercise. It is an essential prerequisite for opening a democratic debate on its legitimacy, on the need for an independent audit, and on the overhaul of a fiscal policy that is finally aligned with social justice and human rights.

Tunisian public debt: the mechanics of a dead-end debt spiral

As of December 31, 2025, outstanding public debt reached 147 billion dinars, or 84% of GDP. This already alarming level masks a decisive qualitative change: the debt is now predominantly domestic, amounting to approximately 88 billion dinars, representing 61% of the total outstanding debt.

This shift reflects the country's gradual financial isolation and its inability to gain sustainable access to international markets. It also reveals a profound change in the nature of financial dependence: Tunisia is no longer solely dependent on its external creditors, but now also on its own banking system and, above all, on the Central Bank of Tunisia.

The Central Bank, now the central financier of the State

At the end of 2025, the outstanding debt of the State to the BCT amounts to 14 billion dinars. This amount results from exceptional facilities granted to the Treasury:

• 7 billion dinars granted in 2024, interest-free, repayable over 10 years with a 3-year grace period;
• An additional $7 billion disbursed in 2025, also interest-free, repayable over 15 years with a three-year grace period;
• At the same time, the government has completed the repayment of 2.8 billion dinars from a facility granted in 2020 at the height of the Covid crisis, in accordance with the supplementary finance law.

These mechanisms, presented as temporary, have become permanent. By the end of 2026, outstanding debt to the BCT is expected to reach 25 billion dinars, as the Treasury mobilizes the new 11 billion dinar facility provided for in the 2026 finance law. This development establishes the Central Bank as the main provider of liquidity to the state, at the cost of increasingly theoretical monetary independence.

2026: debt service still overwhelming

For 2026, the state budget provides for total debt servicing of 23.05 billion dinars, a slight decrease (–6%) compared to the 24.48 billion disbursed in 2025. This apparent improvement is misleading.

In detail:

• repayment of domestic debt principal fell to 7.93 billion dinars (–18%);
• On the other hand, interest on domestic debt skyrocketed, reaching 5.61 billion dinars, up 20.9%.
• the principal of the external debt stands at 7.92 billion dinars (–5.5%);
• external interest fell to 1.6 billion dinars (–10.9%).

In other words, the government repays slightly less capital, but still pays more for the cost of domestic debt, which accentuates the crowding-out effect on investment and social spending.

Tough deadlines, especially away from home

On the domestic market, the main expenses relate to the repayment of bonds issued from domestic loans (2.68 billion dinars) and 52-week Treasury bills (2.6 billion dinars).

Externally, 2026 will be marked by a symbolic deadline: the repayment in July of the Eurobond issued in 2019, for a principal amount of 2.35 billion dinars, plus 150 million dinars in interest. This loan, taken out at a rate of 6.375%, remains Tunisia's last significant access to the international financial market.

In addition, there were substantial repayments to Afreximbank (1.22 billion dinars), the International Monetary Fund (834 million dinars), and Saudi Arabia (233 million dinars).

Borrow more than you repay

The central paradox of 2026 is this: the government is planning to take on nearly 26 billion dinars in new loans, while capital repayments amount to less than 16 billion dinars. The debt therefore continues to grow automatically.

Domestic borrowing will account for nearly two-thirds of the total, or 19 billion dinars, including:

• $2.5 billion via 52-week Treasury bills;
• $4.84 billion in Treasury-like securities (BTA), a sharp decline compared to 2025;
• $716 million in domestic foreign currency loans;
• 11 billion dinars in the form of new facilities from the BCT.

This structure illustrates the depletion of domestic resources and the growing dependence on indirect money creation.

An uncertain international comeback

On the external side, Tunisia is planning for 6.8 billion dinars in financing, but the 2026 finance law only formally identifies 2.98 billion from multilateral and bilateral donors. The rest is based on fragile assumptions, including a hoped-for 400 million euro raise on international markets—the first since 2019. In the current context of a downgraded sovereign rating and no agreement with the IMF, this operation appears highly uncertain.

A trajectory with serious social consequences

Since July 2021, public debt has increased by around 60%, or nearly 60 billion dinars. In six years, it has risen from 98 billion dinars in June 2020 to a projected 157 billion by the end of 2026. This trend is not neutral: every dinar spent on debt servicing is a dinar taken away from health, education, public investment, and the reduction of regional inequalities.

Tunisia's debt is therefore not only excessive, it has become structurally antisocial. By borrowing to finance its day-to-day operations and postponing reforms, the state is passing on the cost of the crisis to future generations and compromising the effective exercise of economic and social rights.

The accumulation of debt is neither inevitable nor simply a consequence of external shocks. It is the product of a stagnant economic model, an unfair tax system and, more recently, opaque governance that has replaced democratic debate with debt. Enriching the diagnosis with figures, as the CRLDHT meetings have done, leads to a clear conclusion: without a break in debt management, it will continue to trap Tunisia in a lasting financial, social, and democratic crisis.