The iconic and sinister case known as the “conspiracy against state security,” or “Conspiracy Case No. 1,” which set the tone for the repression and the authoritarian drift of the Tunisian regime after July 25, 2021, epitomizes many of the attacks on the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and Tunisian political life.
It is difficult today to discuss the cassation stage without recalling, even briefly, the judicial process that led up to it.
A legal proceeding initiated in February 2023
The case began on February 10, 2023, when a police unit reported to the Minister of Justice the alleged existence of a plot against state security. On the same day, the minister referred the matter to the prosecutor’s office. The first arrests began on February 11, under anti-terrorism legislation, with initial restrictions on access to attorneys.
On February 24, 2023, the prosecutor’s office of the Judicial Unit for Combating Terrorism formally opened an investigation into a conspiracy against the internal and external security of the state. In the days that followed, several opposition figures were placed in pretrial detention.
The investigation, which has lasted more than a year, has been denounced by the defense as sloppy, incomplete, and deeply marred by irregularities—both in the conduct of the investigations and in the[bb1]unlawfully prolonged use of pretrial detention. Furthermore, it has taken place against a backdrop of repeated interventions by the executive branch and the President of the Republic in this case. In April 2024, the investigating judge closed the investigation, a decision that was itself strongly contested by the defense attorneys.
The case is then referred to the Indictment Division, and subsequently to the Court of Cassation, which upholds the decision to refer the defendants to the Specialized Criminal Chamber of the Tunis Court of First Instance. Following the trial court’s judgment, the case is heard on appeal on November 27, 2025, and is subsequently the subject of a petition for cassation, scheduled to be heard on September 3, 2026.
The appeal and then the cassation
The appeal brought its own set of alleged violations of the right to a fair trial: the continuation of the trial remotely, the denial of several requests by the defense, and, according to the attorneys, the absence of a genuine adversarial debate on the essential elements of the case.
On November 27, 2025, the Court of Appeals issued its ruling. Although some adjustments were made to the sentences, the general substance of the judgment was upheld.
From the defense’s perspective, the ruling effectively amounts to a judicial confirmation of what President Kaïs Saïed had already publicly stated at the outset of the case, when he labeled those arrested as terrorists and issued particularly stern warnings to any judges who might have considered releasing them.
The authorities swiftly carried out the appellate court’s ruling, notably by arresting Ayachi Hammami, Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, and Chaima Issa, who had until then been appearing in court while free on bail.
The convicted individuals then filed appeals with the Court of Cassation.
And, somewhat unexpectedly given the court schedule, the hearing of the case before the Court of Cassation has been set for September 3, 2026.
So here we are, more than three and a half years after the first arrests in February 2023, facing another decisive stage in an exceptionally long legal process[bb2].
So the question today is simple: Will the appeal to the Court of Cassation be a way to drag out the case even longer, or an opportunity to finally bring it to a close?
A Case That Has Already Gone Global
The case has long since spread beyond Tunisia's borders.
It has been the subject not only of statements and interventions by independent special rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, but also of a particularly significant decision by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
In its opinion adopted at its 100th session, held from August 26 to 30, 2024, the Working Group characterized the detention of Mohamed Khayam Turki, Chaima Issa, Abdelhamid Jelassi, Issam Chebbi, Ghazi Chaouachi, Ridha Belhaj, Jaouhar Ben Mbarek, and Mohamed Lazhar Akremi as arbitrary, and called on the Tunisian authorities to take the necessary measures to remedy their situation, including their release and the granting of the right to redress.
It should be noted that a case may be brought before the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention even while domestic remedies are still pending.
Some families of detainees have even gone so far as to file a complaint with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, even though the chances of such a move succeeding appear slim.
On October 28, 2023, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also ordered provisional measures concerning, in particular, attorneys Ghazi Chaouachi and Noureddine Bhiri in Case No. 004/2023, relating specifically to their health, their rights and those of their families, as well as their ability to conduct their defense.
The Tunisian government, which had not demonstrated full implementation of these measures, requested their withdrawal, citing, in particular, Tunisia’s withdrawal of the declaration filed pursuant to Article 34, paragraph 6, of the Protocol establishing the Court. This request was rejected on March 17, 2025.
The so-called “conspiracy case” was also brought before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights inCase No. 008/2026, filed notably by Mohamed Khayam Turki, Noureddine Bhiri, Jaouhar Ben Mbarek, Ghazi Chaouachi, Ridha Belhaj, Abdelhamid Jelassi, Sahbi Atig, and Chaima Issa, who accuse the Tunisian government of numerous human rights violations they believe they have suffered.
In his response, the state’s legal counsel disputes all of these allegations.
It should also be noted that an appeal to the Court of Cassation, as an extraordinary remedy, does not necessarily constitute, in the context of proceedings before the African Court, a domestic remedy that must be exhausted before a petition can be declared admissible.
Theoretical Legal Scenarios
It goes without saying that today, in Tunisia, the genuine independence of judges is at the heart of the problem. A climate of fear hangs over the judiciary, particularly in this case, where President Kaïs Saïed has, since the first arrests, repeatedly issued warnings to judges who might rule in favor of the defendants.
However, from a legal standpoint, several scenarios remain possible.
The Court of Cassation may dismiss the appeals and uphold the challenged appellate decision. Subject to any other proceedings that may be pending, this would then mark the final stage of the ordinary criminal proceedings concerning these convictions.
It may also set aside all or part of the contested judgment and remand the case to a trial court with a different composition for a new hearing within the limits of the reversal ordered.
The Court of Cassation’s ruling thus restores the proceedings, within the limits of the provisions that were overturned, to the state they were in prior to the annulled decision. This immediately raises the question of the status of those currently incarcerated pursuant to the overturned ruling, notably Ayachi Hammami, Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, and Chaima Issa.
A reversal without remand seems much less likely in this case, but it is still possible that the hearing of the appeals will be postponed at the September 3 hearing.
Political Issues
However, it is difficult to focus solely on the legal issues in this case without examining its political implications. Two questions arise: Why now? And what might be the desired outcomes?
As for the schedule, September 3 may seem a bit early, since many had expected the first hearing to be set for after the start of the judicial term on September 16.
It is hard to imagine that this calendar is politically neutral.
Why would those in power have an interest in speeding up the investigation of this case?
There are several possible answers.
Given the extremely unfavorable—even catastrophic—circumstances facing the current regime, one possible explanation would be that this is a diversionary tactic: to bring back into the public sphere the debates about the decade described as “dark” by Kaïs Saïed and his supporters and, in this way, reignite the old disagreements among the various factions of the opposition regarding democracy and the democratic transition period.
When we talk about public debate today, we’re really talking mainly about social media: there’s practically no genuine, adversarial debate left in traditional broadcast media, which have largely been brought to heel.
Social media has become the arena—or even the agora—of public debate, under the constant threat—and we must never forget this—of Decree-Law No. 54 of 2022 and the entire body of repressive legislation that accompanies it.
As for possible outcomes, it is difficult to completely separate the judicial decision from the political context.
A partial reversal with remand would prolong the case while giving the impression of a respite in the crackdown. Such a solution could serve a regime more interested in maneuvering than in genuine openness.
The government knows that releasing some of its main political opponents or overturning their convictions would inevitably change the political landscape. Maintaining uncertainty could therefore be a tactic: not closing the case, but also not immediately accepting the definitive confirmation of all the convictions.
Nor should we forget that, for Kaïs Saïed and his propagandists, the harsh sentences handed down to opponents are presented as a victory. They might therefore seek, on the contrary, to restore the president’s reputation by securing confirmation of the sentences—or even, after an appeal to the Court of Cassation and remand, having them increased by the court to which the case was remanded.
However, given the particularly opaque nature of the decision-making process at the highest levels of power, all scenarios must be considered.
It is no longer entirely impossible to imagine that Kaïs Saïed no longer has the same control over decision-making and that other regime officials are seeking to calm the situation, pave the way for change, or, at the very least, show that there are still “adults in the room.”
We might then see a few releases, or even a few carefully selected acquittals, which could also sow discord among the various opposition movements.
The decisions made by the Administrative Court during the presidential election set an interesting precedent in this regard, assuming that a genuine backroom power struggle exists today within the intricacies of the government.
This “inside job” (an outcome originating from within the system)—which one might hope for, if only for humanitarian reasons concerning the detainees and their families—remains, unfortunately, difficult to predict.
But it could also be an “outside job”(external pressure)—that is, an opening requested or encouraged by certain external supporters of the regime, notably the European Union, or even by the Algerian regime itself, which is concerned about a possible explosion of the Tunisian “pressure cooker” and the return, to its borders, of the specter of a new democratic transition.
However, the likelihood that the Court of Appeals will uphold the ruling remains just as realistic—and perhaps even the most likely outcome.
This would be a way for Kaïs Saïed to put an end, through the courts, to several of his main critics, to reaffirm his omnipotence against all odds, and to show that the considerable difficulties the country has faced during this catastrophic summer have in no way diminished his ability to crack down and instill fear.
This demonstration might seem all the more necessary to him given that protest movements are now spreading to an increasingly diverse range of segments of the population, as we approach a season that has historically been unfavorable to authoritarian regimes.
Kaïs Saïed’s special relationship with history and his fear of going down in history with a tarnished reputation could also explain his desire to expedite the resolution of this case and other similar cases—provided he doesn’t create new ones in the meantime.
At least there is still hope.
May this case—which marked one of the major turning points in the excessive crackdown on political opponents—also mark the beginning of the end of that crackdown.
Paris, September1, 2026
[bb1]Unlawfully Extended Appeal
[bb2]Unconventional but not long
